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First, thank you for taking the time to read the ILR Cornell Sports Business 
Society Magazine. On behalf of our entire team of writers, editors, and E-Board, 
we thank you for your support. This magazine is a celebration of the outstanding 
research performed by our members throughout the Fall 2014 semester. Their 
work embodies the core values of our organization, the ILR School, and Cornell 
as a whole. 
A primary objective of our organization is to offer students opportunities to 
apply the knowledge learned in their academic coursework to the sports business 
world. Through practical applications, such as this magazine, we hope that our 
members will be in a better position to succeed in the competitive landscape that 
is the sports industry. As you sift through the following pages, please keep this in 
mind, and enjoy the detailed and hard work of each of our contributors.  
The President’s Greeting:
Alex Smith ‘15
Check out our new website at www.cornellsportsbusiness.org
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Why They Call Him “Money”
Karthik Sekharan ‘17
Most superstar athletes 
have a nickname of some sort. 
Lebron James is “The King,” 
Derek Jeter is “The Captain,” 
and Marshawn Lynch has been 
dubbed “Beast Mode.”  The 
birthplace of most of these 
names are easy to explain. 
James is arguably one of the 
best athletes to have ever 
played the game of basketball, 
Jeter’s leadership abilities are 
unmatched by even the most 
veteran of baseball players, and 
Lynch, a fierce running back, 
is known for an energetic and 
aggressive playing style.  
While these athletes have 
nicknames that speak to their 
attributes on the playing field, 
Floyd Mayweather Jr. has a 
nickname that is a little different 
in nature.  Floyd “Money” 
Mayweather did not simply 
happen into 
becoming the 
richest athlete 
on the planet 
by being good 
at boxing. 
His business 
model, though 
i n c r e d i b l y 
risky, is what 
has propelled 
him to the 
extreme wealth 
that he has.
F l o y d 
Maywea the r 
Jr.’s official 
boxing record 
is 47-0 after 
his most recent match against 
Marcos Maidana.  He has been 
internationally recognized 
for his skill and has won 
numerous awards including 
the International Boxing Award 
Fighter of the Year in 1998 
and 2007, the World Boxing 
this extreme accumulation of 
wealth.  This begs the question: 
why is he so rich?  The answer 
to this question requires a bit of 
an explanation.
Boxing, while being a 
lucrative industry, is a sport 
that has been rapidly declining 
in popularity in America.  In 
order to account for this, the 
biggest matches that any 
serious boxing fan needs to 
watch are on Pay-Per-View for 
upwards of $80 per match.  On 
top of that, tickets to watch a 
match at the MGM Grand or 
any other boxing venue range 
from $500 to $2,000.  In other 
words, you need to have serious 
money to be a boxing fan.  Of 
the revenue that is made from 
Pay-Per-View and ticket sales, 
a significant percentage of it 
goes to the promoter.  
Most boxers hire a promoter 
before every big fight.  The 
promoter’s job is, as the name 
implies, to promote the fight.  In 
addition, they pay for every cost 
associated with the fight.  These 
include venue costs, referee 
costs, and other costs right 
down to the cups that the beer 
is served in.  While the boxer 
pays the promoter a set fee, the 
promoter assumes all financial 
risk.  That is, if the fight does 
not bring in the expected profit, 
then the promoter is the one 
losing a significant amount of 
money.  However, with this 
risk comes a great reward if 
everything works out.  If the 
fight brings in a significant 
profit, the promoter rakes in a 
huge chunk of it.  So the boxer 
makes a small percentage of 
that profit while the promoter 
makes most of it.  
What did Mayweather 
do to avoid losing all that 
potential profit?  He bypassed 
the middleman.  He founded 
Mayweather Promotions, his 
own promotions company. 
Since all of his fights net 
enormous profits, he makes 
most, if not all, of that money. 
He doesn’t have to give the 
majority of it to some outside 
promoter.  However, up until 
July 2014, Mayweather 
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“What did 
Mayweather 
do to avoid 
losing all 
that potential 
profit? He 
bypassed the 
middleman.”
FLOYD “MONEY” MAYWEATHER has redefined the boxing industry by combining his 
unparalleled performance in the ring with his ability to recognize new opportunities on the 
business side of the sport.
Photo courtesy of ESPN
Hall of Fame Fighter of the 
Year in 2002, and the ESPY 
Award for Best Fighter in 
2012.  Throughout his career 
Maywea the r 
h a s 
accumulated 
an extreme 
amount of 
wealth.  Solely 
from fights, 
Maywea the r 
has netted 
more than 
$400 million 
in his career. 
Pay-Per-View 
revenue from 
his whole 
career has 
earned him an 
estimated total 
of $1 billion. 
In addition, endorsement deals 
provide him with a steady 
stream of revenue.  All in all, 
estimates have him being worth 
around $280 million.  While 
being an accredited boxer like 
Mayweather is sure to have its 
perks, it is no explanation for 
Promotions has had to partner and co-
promote with Golden Boy Promotions since, 
up until that point, they did not have their 
promoter’s license.  Now that Mayweather 
Promotions has its 
license, Mayweather 
Jr. will be making large 
amounts of money even 
after he retires, since 
the company intends to 
continue representing other boxers.
One may ask, “Why don’t all boxers 
just bypass the middleman and start their 
own promotions company?”  The answer 
is that it is so incredibly risky.  With the 
Karthik Sekharan is a sophomore in the ILR 
School. He can be reached at kns44@cornell.
edu.
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costs that go into promoting and hosting 
one fight, if profits were less than expected 
it could send some fighters into bankruptcy. 
Showtime Vice President Stephen Espinosa 
has said that while 
other boxers have tried 
this business model, 
“relying on your own 
blood, sweat and tears 
to maximize your event 
doesn’t work if you haven’t built over time 
the kind of appeal that Floyd has.”
Floyd “Money” Mayweather has taken 
control of the boxing industry.  When he 
announces the date of his fight, he becomes 
a general commanding a small army that 
works furiously for 12 weeks to create 
his vision of fight night.  And every time 
he steps into the ring, he meets and maybe 
even exceeds expectations by proving time 
and time again that he is undoubtedly the 
best fighter on the face of the earth.
The Cornell ILR Sports Business Society would like to congratulate Robert Manfred ‘80, on being 
unanimously elected as the 10th Commissioner in Major League Baseball history! Several ILR 
Sports Business Society members had the honor of attending a special event hosted by Cornell 
Alumni Affairs at MLB headquarters in December 2013. Rob Manfred and NHL Commissioner Gary 
Bettman were members of a panel that was moderated by Dean Harry Katz. The panel discussion 
was preceded by a networking opportunity for the students and many ILR alumni in attendance.
Congratulations to Robert D. Manfred, ILR ’80
The Olympics As A Legal Steroid:
Jason Lefkovitz ‘16
Introduction
On August 1, 2014, the USA men’s 
basketball team held a televised, intra-
team scrimmage in Las Vegas as part of 
the preparatory process for the 2014 FIBA 
World Cup. The game was intended to 
serve as an innocuous way to evaluate the 
pool of selected players and finalize the 
roster for the tournament. Unfortunately, 
in the third quarter of the scrimmage, 
everything went awry when Indiana 
Pacers All-Star forward Paul George 
snapped his lower right leg in half on a 
backboard stanchion. Suffering compound 
fractures of his right tibia and fibula 
bones, George would inevitably miss 
not only the tournament but also the 
2014 NBA season.
The gruesomeness of such an injury 
can really haunt one’s thoughts. I still 
remember where I was and what I was 
eating when I witnessed the horrific 
spectacle. I couldn’t stop thinking about 
Paul George’s injury for days afterward. 
However, this was oddly not the first 
time I saw a compound leg fracture on 
television. I was watching live when Kevin 
Ware of the Louisville Cardinals men’s 
basketball team suffered a very similar 
injury during the 2013 NCAA Division 
I Men’s Basketball Tournament. So why 
did Paul George’s injury resonate with 
me to such a great degree? Unlike Kevin 
Ware, Paul George was a professional 
whose livelihood depended on his ability 
to play. If it weren’t for Paul George’s 
contract extension, he could have lost 
millions of dollars in the event that he 
couldn’t fully recover from the injury. 
In addition, the implications of the 
injury reach beyond the scope of the 
individual player. For instance, how would 
the Pacers fare in the absence of their 
most valuable and most expensive asset? 
In the wake of that fateful August 1st 
night, such concerns echoed from media 
outlets across the country, prompting 
an age-old debate: should NBA players 
participate in international competitions 
and how much control should NBA teams 
have over these decisions? Currently, 
NBA players have full autonomy in the 
decision to play for their countries in 
international competitions. 
NBA owners like the Dallas Mavericks’ 
Mark Cuban have vehemently opposed 
the status quo. It is not difficult to 
sympathize with their perspective, for 
such owners invest millions of dollars 
in their players in order to generate 
success and, in turn, revenue for their 
teams. Seeking to minimize the risks of 
playing basketball in any setting, these 
owners want to prevent their players from 
playing for any cause unrelated to their 
own teams’ success. Specifically, the 
exploits of their players in international 
competition do not directly generate any 
revenue for their teams. 
In reality, however, it is impossible 
to completely prevent the incidence of 
injury off the NBA hard-court. Even if top 
NBA players chose to avoid international 
competitions during the offseason, they 
would still play in exhibition leagues 
and pickup games like many of their 
peers do. In addition, despite the risk of 
injury, many NBA players have a desire 
to represent their country in competitions 
like the Olympics. Players are not only 
patriotic but are also aware of the notoriety 
that comes with international success. 
Many of these players undoubtedly know 
PAUL GEORGE’S horrific leg injury illustrated the dangers that players can face by participating in international competition.
Photo courtesy of the New York Post
How Participation Enhances NBA Player Performance
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1992 Dream Team PER Before ('91-'92) PER After ('92-'93) Difference Average Difference
Robinson, David 27.5 24.2 3.3
Ewing, Patrick 22.8 20.8 2
Pippen, Scottie 21.5 19.2 2.3
Jordan, Michael 27.7 29.7 -2
Drexler, Clyde 23.6 20.7 2.9
Malone, Karl 25.4 26.2 -0.8
Stockton, John 22.8 21.3 1.5
Mullin, Chris 19.9 19 0.9
Barkley, Charles 24.5 25.9 -1.4
Johnson, Magic NI
Bird, Larry NI
Laettner, Christian NI
0.97
1996 Olympic Team PER Before ('95-'96) PER After ('96-'97) Difference Average Difference
Charles Barkley 24.8 23 1.8
Penny Hardaway 24.6 21.4 3.2
Grant Hill 20.9 25.5 -4.6
Karl Malone 26 28.9 -2.9
Reggie Miller 20.1 20.2 -0.1
Shaquille O'Neal 26.4 27.1 -0.7
Hakeem Olajuwon 25.5 22.7 2.8
Gary Payton 19.6 21.8 -2.2
Scottie Pippen 21 21.3 -0.3
Mitch Richmond 19.2 21.6 -2.4
David Robinson NI
John Stockton 21.9 22.1 -0.2
-0.51
2000 Olympic Team PER Before ('99-'00) PER After ('00-'01) Difference Average Difference
Shareef Abdur-Rahim 20.2 19.1 1.1
Ray Allen 20.6 22.9 -2.3
Vin Baker 14 13 1
Vince Carter 23.4 25 -1.6
Kevin Garnett 23.6 23.9 -0.3
Tim Hardaway 16.4 16.7 -0.3
Allan Houston 16.5 16.1 0.4
Jason Kidd 18.4 19.4 -1
Antonio McDyess 19.6 22 -2.4
Alonzo Mourning NI
Gary Payton 23.6 22.1 1.5
Steve Smith 17.3 15.9 1.4
-0.23
2004 Olympic Team PER Before ('03-'04) PER After ('04-'05) Difference Average Difference
Carmelo Anthony 17.6 16.7 0.9
Carlos Boozer 20.8 19.2 1.6
Tim Duncan 27.1 27 0.1
Allen Iverson 19.3 23.2 -3.9
LeBron James 18.3 25.7 -7.4
Richard Jefferson NI
Stephon Marbury 20.4 21.9 -1.5
Shawn Marion 19.9 21.7 -1.8
Lamar Odom 18.5 17.3 1.2
Emeka Okafor NI
Amar'e Stoudemire 19.8 26.6 -6.8
Dwyane Wade 17.6 23.1 -5.5
-2.31
2008 Olympic Team PER Before ('07-'08) PER After ('08-'09) Difference Average Difference
Carlos Boozer NI
Jason Kidd 16.7 16.9 -0.2
LeBron James 29.1 31.7 -2.6
Deron Williams 20.8 21.1 -0.3
Michael Redd NI
Dwyane Wade 21.5 30.4 -8.9
Kobe Bryant 24.2 24.4 -0.2
Dwight Howard 22.9 25.4 -2.5
Chris Bosh 23.8 22.1 1.7
Chris Paul 28.3 30 -1.7
Tayshaun Prince 15.6 15 0.6
Carmelo Anthony 21.1 19 2.1
-1.2
2012 Olympic Team PER Before ('11-'12) PER After ('12-'13) Difference Average Difference
Anthony Davis NI
James Harden 21.1 23 -1.9
Kevin Durant 26.2 28.3 -2.1
Russell Westbrook 22.9 23.9 -1
LeBron James 30.7 31.6 -0.9
Carmelo Anthony 21.1 24.8 -3.7
Chris Paul 27 26.4 0.6
Tyson Chandler 18.7 18.9 -0.2
Kevin Love NI
Deron Williams 20.3 20.3 0
Andre Iguodala 17.6 15.2 2.4
Kobe Bryant 21.9 23 -1.1
-0.79
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about the aura of the famous 
1992 Dream Team. 
Thus, I do not believe 
that the possibility of injury 
is sufficient justification for 
giving NBA owners control 
over a player’s decision to play 
in international competition. 
Instead, perhaps there should 
be concern over the effect of 
international play on player 
performance for their NBA 
teams. Specifically, in contrast 
to any friendly offseason 
pickup game, international play 
requires players to endure an 
extra month of physically taxing 
practices and competition akin 
to those during the actual 
NBA season. With this in 
mind, perhaps participation 
in international competition can 
yield fatigue that compromises 
player performance in the 
following NBA season. If there 
is a statistically significant 
effect, perhaps owners have a 
legitimate argument for more 
control over their players’ 
offseason decisions. Therefore, 
I decided to conduct in depth 
research and analyze the 
possibility of such an effect.
Research/Analysis
Let me take a moment to 
outline the parameters of my 
data and research. To avoid 
complexity, I focused on the 
Olympics, which is by far the 
most prominent international 
b a s k e t b a l l  c o m p e t i t i o n 
and which unquestionably 
attracts the best NBA players. 
Moreover, I decided to focus 
on Team USA because that 
Olympic team features the 
most prestigious NBA players. 
Thus, I amalgamated into 
one data set all 6 USA Olympic 
men’s basketball rosters since 
the 1992 Dream Team, which 
have prominently featured 
active NBA players. For each 
player, I investigated player 
performance in the season 
leading up to the summer in 
which he competed in the 
Olympics and then player 
performance in the season 
immediately following that 
summer. I omitted from the 
analysis any player that did 
not play a sufficient number of 
games in the season before or 
after his Olympic participation. 
To establish objectivity, I 
concretely defined “sufficient” 
to mean playing 50% or more 
of the games during the season 
(in the lockout-shortened 2011-
2012 season, any player who 
played 33 games or more was 
deemed eligible for analysis). 
This rule resulted in the 
elimination of 11 players from 
the analysis.
I  uti l ized the statistic 
Player Efficiency Rating (PER) 
because it is a comprehensive 
statistic that evaluates player 
performance while controlling 
for differences in players’ 
positions, team roles, and 
playing time. According to 
Basketball Reference.com, PER 
is “a measure of per-minute 
production standardized such 
that the league average is 15.” 
To calculate the Olympics’ 
effect on player performance, 
I computed for each player 
the difference between his 
PER in the season leading 
up to the Olympics and the 
PER in the season right after 
the Olympics. Then, for each 
Olympic team, I calculated 
the average difference in PER 
among that team’s players.
My findings are displayed 
on Page 8 and Page 9. Note that 
1) the average 
differences for 
each Olympic 
team (i.e. PER 
before – PER 
A f t e r )  a r e 
h igh l i gh t ed 
i n  y e l l o w 
and, 2) for the 
players that I 
omitted from 
the analysis, 
I put the acronym NI next to 
their names, which stands for 
“not included.”
Interestingly,  the data 
produce a  t rend that  i s 
almost antithetical to what I 
hypothesized: the data suggest 
that NBA players (at least 
those on Team USA) generally 
improve performance in the 
season after they participate 
in the Olympics. Specifically, 
5 out of 6 teams exhibited a 
negative average difference in 
PER from one season to the 
next (i.e. PER After > PER 
Before), and 37 out of the 61 
PER differences (approximately 
61%) included in the data set 
were negative. 
To  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h i s 
phenomenon even further, I 
decided to test if there was 
a statist ically significant 
improvement in PER among the 
players in the season after they 
participated in the Olympics. 
I decided to employ a more 
advanced statistical analysis 
of the data: hypothesis testing. 
Let me spend a few moments 
providing a general overview 
of this statistical process. 
Sc i en t i s t s  and  o the r 
researchers seek to learn about 
population parameters, which 
are real-world values (such as 
a mean or a standard deviation) 
that we can’t possibly know 
without collecting every piece 
of relevant data in the world. 
Since obtaining every piece of 
data is impossible, scientists 
use statistics to make inferences 
abou t  t he se  popu la t i on 
parameters. For example, if 
scientists wanted to compute 
the actual average height of 
Americans, they would have 
to measure the height of all 
300+ million 
A m e r i c a n s . 
Since this is 
i m p o s s i b l e , 
s c i e n t i s t s 
would resort 
to  tak ing  a 
representative 
sample of the 
p o p u l a t i o n 
and using the 
average height 
from this sample to make 
inferences about the real 
average height.
Hypothesis testing is a 
type of statistical inference. 
To paraphrase my Introductory 
Sta t i s t ics  professor,  the 
mechanics of hypothesis testing 
mirror those of an American 
courtroom. Specifically, in 
court, we assume a defendant is 
innocent until there is sufficient 
evidence to prove guilt (i.e. 
beyond a reasonable doubt). 
Graphic by Jason Lefkovitz
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Jason Lefkovitz is a junior in the 
ILR School. He can be reached at 
jal484@cornell.edu.
Analogously, in hypothesis testing, we 
assume a certain status quo until there is 
sufficient, statistically significant evidence 
to prove otherwise. In 
statistics, the status 
quo is called the null 
hypothesis. Just like 
a ruling of guilty in 
a courtroom, when 
there is statistically 
significant evidence 
to disprove the null 
hypothesis, we reject it. 
The “guilty ruling” in 
statistics is called the 
alternative hypothesis. 
A key  way  to 
measure “statistical 
s i g n i f i c a n c e ”  i s 
w i t h  a  p - v a l u e , 
which measures the 
probabi l i ty  that  a 
sample will yield the 
data obtained given 
that the null hypothesis 
is true. If the probability of seeing the data 
from our sample is really low assuming 
that the null is true, then statisticians 
assume that the null is not true and reject 
it. Similarly, in the courtroom, if there is 
enough incriminating evidence, the jury 
will deem the defendant’s innocence (i.e. 
the null hypothesis) to be very improbable 
and rule the defendant guilty. 
Researchers use threshold p-values, 
called significance levels, to establish 
when data are statistically significant 
enough to reject the null hypothesis. If 
the p-value is lower than the established 
significance level, then the null hypothesis 
is rejected. Significance levels vary with 
the nature of the research, but perhaps 
the most common significance level is 
5% (a p-value of 0.05).
I conducted my analysis with a 
paired t-test, which is the ideal kind of 
hypothesis testing for the PER differences. 
A paired t-test takes two groups of data 
for different individuals in a study (such 
as “before-and-after” data) and finds 
the difference in the two groups of data 
for each individual. Then, the paired 
t-test takes this group of differences 
and makes inferences about the mean 
of these differences. So, for the NBA 
data, the paired t-test would take the 61 
PER differences computed in the analysis 
above and make inferences about the true 
average change in PER of NBA players 
from the season before they play in the 
Olympics to the season after they play. 
In my analysis, the null hypothesis was 
that the true mean difference in PER from 
one season to the next is equal to 0 (i.e. 
that there is no statistically significant 
difference in PER 
on average between 
the two seasons for 
NBA players), and the 
alternative hypothesis 
was that the mean 
difference was less 
than 0 (i.e. that the 
PER in the season 
after  the Olympics 
was greater on average 
than the season before 
the  Olympics ) .  I 
utilized a significance 
level of 5%, for, as 
aforementioned, that 
is probably the most 
common level used in 
statistical analyses.
The results, as can 
be seen in the charts 
on Page 8 and 9, show 
an extremely low p-vaule of 0.0178 or 
a mere 1.78% probability that our data 
would be obtained if the mean difference 
in PER was equal to zero. Since, this 
p-value is less than the 5% significance 
level, there is sufficient, statistically 
significant evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis and accept the alternative that 
the mean difference in PER is less than 
0. In other words, there is statistically 
significant evidence to suggest that, on 
average, the PER’s of NBA players on 
Team USA increase in the season after 
competing in the Olympics.
Conclusion
These findings are not necessarily 
counter-intuitive, for there are various 
reasons why an NBA athlete playing for 
Team USA might improve during his 
Olympic experience. Team USA usually 
consists of the best players in the world, 
so the best are competing against the best 
in practices. Therefore, these players 
can improve from the sheer challenge 
of competing against the best, perhaps 
learning from their equally capable peers 
new skills that can complement their 
current basketball repertoires. 
In addition, a player may develop a 
better work ethic during the experience. 
By their competitive nature and their 
egos, players may be motivated to work 
harder so they could outperform the elite 
players around them, or they may want 
to emulate all-time greats like Kobe or 
LeBron, who are notorious gym rats. 
Nevertheless, one may still have 
some concerns with these findings. First, 
some of the players that I omitted from 
the dataset missed significant time in 
the season following the Olympics due 
to significant injuries. For instance, 
David Robinson was omitted from the 
1996 Team’s data because he missed 76 
games with a back injury and a broken 
foot. Perhaps one might attribute these 
injuries to the extra wear and tear on his 
body during the Olympics the previous 
summer. In response to such concerns, 
it is impossible to isolate the effects of 
the Olympics from those of the 1995-
1996 NBA season or those of the 1996-
1997 Preseason. Let’s not forget that 
such injuries could have also been freak 
accidents in the same way that many people 
get injured on a daily basis. Since it is 
impossible to know whether competing 
in the Olympics actually increased the 
probability of injury, it is pointless to 
include such concerns in the conversation. 
Second, one may point out that I only 
analyzed players from Team USA. Perhaps 
other countries’ basketball programs, 
which surely lack the quality coaches 
and players that make up Team USA, 
can’t offer the same kind of enriching 
Olympic experience for their players. 
Although I concede that this fact may 
pose limitations on the power of my 
findings, I still assert that these findings 
can provide very useful perspective for 
NBA owners. Since most NBA players 
(and, for the most part, the best ones) 
are American and would thus play for 
Team USA, the effects of a Team USA 
experience on NBA player performance are 
important for NBA owners to understand. 
As articulated above, my findings 
illustrate that playing for Team USA 
in the Olympics yields, on average, a 
statistically significant improvement in 
player performance the following season. 
Therefore, I would strongly recommend 
to NBA owners to not only allow but 
also actively encourage their players 
to play for Team USA in the Olympics.
“Players are not 
only patriotic but 
are also aware 
of the notoriety 
that comes with 
international 
success.”
11Fall 2014
THE FANATICS pictured above actually own both of the Spanish giants.
Photo courtesy of Barca Blog
Minggao (Magic) Magic ‘18
“Socialism” Defeats “Capitalism” on the Pitch
During the 2014 summer transfer 
window, Luis Suarez and James Rodriguez, 
two of the biggest names in the soccer 
world, landed in Spain as tons of rumors had 
predicted. To a certain extent, this situation 
epitomizes the soccer transfer market in 
21st century, with the two Spanish giants, 
Real Madrid and Barcelona, signing almost 
all superstars at the peak of their careers, 
while other top European clubs struggle 
to accept negotiation defeats. According 
to the statistics of the Daily Telegraph, a 
newspaper in the United Kingdom, Real 
Madrid and Barcelona are responsible for 
seven of the ten most expensive transfer 
fees of all time.
As a result of great management, they 
have been the two most successful clubs 
around the globe in this century. Since the 
1999-2000 season, these two formidable 
clubs jointly lifted 6 out of 15 titles in 
the UEFA Champions League, the most 
prestigious club competition in European 
football.
In contrast, it seems that Manchester 
United, another top club in Europe, also 
operates well and expands its influence 
in a global context. However, when it 
comes to the attractiveness to superstars 
and the number of winning cups, it still 
cannot compete 
against the two 
Spanish giants. 
Some people 
speculated that 
the English 
Premier League 
is not as rich 
as La Liga, but 
the data shows 
that the Premier 
League is the 
most lucrative 
soccer league. 
More specifically, Wayne Rooney, the 
captain of Manchester United, is earning 
an £15.6m annual salary, which eclipses 
the reported salaries of Cristiano Ronaldo 
and Lionel Messi. 
Other fans assume that the style of 
English matches is rougher and more 
physically challenging. Nevertheless, after 
the establishment of the English Premier 
League in 1990s, the style of the English 
games has become increasingly exquisite 
and focused on beautiful short passes, 
ball movement, and precise penetration. 
So what factors result in the fact that Real 
Madrid and Barcelona are much more 
attractive to stars? The most three critical 
explanations can be boiled down to: 1) Spain 
is inherently attractive to Latino players, 2) 
full support of the Spanish government, 3) 
the vital reason, which is that in the Real 
Madrid and Barcelona fan-owned system, 
a “socialist” ownership equips them with 
superior spending power compared to 
small ownership 
groups that 
d o m i n a t e 
“capi ta l i s t ic” 
clubs.
First of all, 
h i s t o r i c a l l y 
s p e a k i n g , 
Spanish clubs 
are innately 
appealing to 
players from 
Latin America, 
soccer’s biggest 
talent pool. During the hundreds of years 
of colonization, Spain left a number of its 
unique elements in Latin America: culture, 
foods, and most importantly, its language. 
Because of this bond between Latin 
America and Spain, most of the soccer 
players there target Spain as their dream 
destination, a familiar environment where 
people speak the same language and share 
many similar customs to them. 
Moreover, because of the unmatched 
soccer atmosphere and advanced youth 
training system, Latin America has always 
cultivated the best players of each decade. 
For example, arguably the four most 
distinguished soccer players in history, 
Pelé, Maradona, Di Stéfano, and Messi, 
all come from either Argentina or Brazil. 
As a result, Real Madrid and Barcelona are 
easily able to land the superstars of each 
generation. The two cases of Luis Suarez 
and James Rodriguez during the summer 
of 2014 illustrate this point, as they 
each dreamed of playing in Spain since 
childhood.
Under his mother’s influence, James 
Rodriguez has been a lifelong die-hard 
fan of Real Madrid. On April 28th, 2014, 
when the Spanish franchise went to 
challenge Bayern Munich, Rodriguez 
drove himself 584 kilometers all the way 
down to Germany from Monaco with the 
purpose of supporting his side and meeting 
his idol, Cristiano Ronaldo, in person. 
Similarly, while Suarez was still paying 
for Ajax soccer club in 2008, he revealed 
to the media that he would play in Spain 
in the future, without mincing his words 
at all. That was his dream. Thus, even if 
Liverpool fans were excessively lenient 
and tolerant towards him when he fell into 
controversies regarding racism and on-field 
biting, they were unable to keep him. It is 
because of these players’ passion to play 
for their dream teams that Real Madrid and 
Barcelona could almost effortlessly sign 
these desirable stars.
Furthermore, the fact that the 
governments spare no effort in supporting 
these two clubs provides them with a much 
“The team that has 
more money and more 
freedom to spend 
will probably reign 
supreme.” 
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better environment to grow. 
After more than a hundred 
years development, as the 
Spanish duo has consistently 
scored brilliant achievements 
and gradually become the 
spotlight of the soccer world, 
they have reflected their 
respective governments. Real 
Madrid, to a great extent, 
represents the Spanish central 
government, as President 
Florentino Perez always 
emphasizes that the club brings 
glory to the whole country. For 
Barcelona, the club, stands for 
the government of Catalonia 
because of the geography. As 
an ethnic group with extremely 
strong Catalan nationalism, the 
local government stresses the 
development of the club as an 
embodiment of its ethnic group, 
especially in comparison to 
Real Madrid, which is believed 
to the symbol of central 
government. 
For different reasons, the 
two governments pull out 
all the stops to support their 
franchises, particularly in terms 
of taxes and loans. 
Even though Spain is in 
the midst of a severe financial 
crisis, with unemployment at 
26% and youth unemployment 
at 50%, the spending power 
of Madrid and Barcelona was 
unaffected due to the policies 
of the government. According 
to a report published in The 
Independent in July of 2013, 
the government disclosed the 
amount of unpaid taxes owed 
by professional soccer clubs in 
the country’s top 
two divisions. 
The sum was 
a staggering 
£575 million, 
and the two 
p o w e r h o u s e s 
account for most 
of this figure. 
The government 
also treats the two 
clubs generously in terms 
of loans. As shown by an 
official statement in 2014, 
Real Madrid’s debt has grown 
to £ 471 million, with a large 
percentage coming from banks 
and creditors of the Spanish 
government. 
More crucially, Real 
Madrid and Barcelona 
implement the membership 
model of ownership, affording 
them much stronger financial 
aid and spending freedom in 
comparison to other clubs. This 
type of ownership is similar to 
socialism in the sense that fans 
own the club. As a nonprofit 
social organization, the club is 
not supposed to make profits 
for its members; rather, its main 
goal is to pursue trophies and 
glory to please its members. 
Therefore, as long as there is no 
deficit, the club can spend all of 
its money on the enhancement 
of its squad without worrying 
about creating profits. 
On the contrary, nearly 
all franchises in the United 
Kingdom and many in Europe, 
such as Manchester United, 
are registered as limited 
liability companies. 
This is similar 
to a “capitalistic” 
system. They have 
to put a huge 
emphasis on 
making money for 
its shareholders, and 
their financial ability 
is limited to a great 
extent. 
In Europe, at the beginning, 
most soccer clubs adopted the 
ownership of its membership. 
In historical context, clubs 
were simply groups that 
organized soccer lovers to play 
games together after work. 
But as the soccer industry 
professionalized, a large 
number of clubs could not bear 
the burden of skyrocketing 
expenditures. These teams had 
to pay professional players 
wages and went abroad to 
attend the games, a series of 
pressing problems that could 
not be solved by membership 
fees. For instance, around the 
1990s, most Spanish clubs 
were operated with a 
huge amount of debt, 
and more than half 
of them were on the 
brink of bankruptcy. 
In order to reverse 
this deteriorating 
s i t u a t i o n , 
the Spanish 
g o v e r n m e n t 
required clubs to 
transform into limited 
liability companies by 
a June 30th 1992 deadline. 
During the course of this 
reform, four clubs, Real 
Madrid, Barcelona, Athletic 
Bilbao, and CA Osasuna, were 
exempt from the transformation 
because their financial 
conditions were quite healthy, 
and they had a steady income 
and cash flow hat enabled them 
to continuously operate and pay 
their debts. These four Spanish 
franchises have maintained this 
system to this day. 
In 2013, as stated by the 
official statistics, Barcelona 
was number one in terms of 
members with 222,980, with 
each of them paying an annual 
premium of £138. According to 
a report by Deloitte, in addition 
to the astronomical income 
generated by broadcasts and 
advertising, Real Madrid and 
Barcelona generate £444.7 
million and £413.6 million 
respectively, remaining the two 
most lucrative soccer clubs in 
the world. More importantly, 
the regulations of the Spanish 
constitution enable them to 
completely spend their income 
based on their ownership 
feature. As the regulations 
stated, fan-owned clubs cannot 
make profits. In other words, 
they have to use up all of their 
incomes from membership fees 
and other revenues to maintain 
their day-to-day operations. 
These reasons explain the 
unparalleled financial strength 
of the two Spanish giants. 
Even though there are 
still potential problems of 
the system of membership 
ownership, such as the severe 
corruption of the club’s 
president who wields huge 
power, the “socialist” clubs 
have generally defeated 
the “capitalist” ones 
throughout the 21st 
century. In short, as 
spending power plays 
an increasingly 
crucial role in the 
modern sports 
industry, the team 
that has more 
money and more 
freedom to spend will 
probably reign supreme.
Photo courtesy of Global Economic Intersection
Magic Peng is a freshman in the 
ILR School. He can be reached at 
mp787@cornell.edu.
13Fall 2014
Damian O’Sullivan ‘17
The increasingly prevalent 
decis ion by professional 
baseball players to undergo 
Tommy John surgery has given 
rise to the question of whether 
or not the frequency of these 
elbow injuries has reached 
epidemic proportions. Sports 
medicine professionals often 
cite the competitive nature of 
youth baseball, as the root cause 
of these injuries and thus, Major 
League Baseball is limited 
in the extent to which it can 
reverse this alarming trend. 
With approximately one-
third of MLB pitchers having 
undergone this surgery in lieu 
of prematurely ending, or never 
beginning, their professional 
careers, this surgery has had a 
pervasive effect on the game. 
Had this many talented pitchers 
been replaced by their long-
relief or Triple-A counterparts, 
the balance between hitters 
and pitchers would have 
been altered, resulting in a 
very different Major League 
Baseball. Beyond affecting the 
PITCHERS LIKE Stephen Strasburg have such a big impact on the performance of their teams, both on and off the field. Tommy 
John surgery could prove costly not just to a player’s career, but to the direction of an entire organization.
Photo courtesy of the Washington Post
competitive balance in Major 
League Baseball, star pitchers 
are also sizeable financial assets 
to teams. 
As a result, this surgery 
has a substantial economic 
impact on baseball that affects 
practices such as scouting, 
which  demons t ra tes  the 
broad impact that Tommy 
John surgery has on Major 
League Baseball. 
Tommy John surgery is 
a relatively new medical 
procedure in which the ulnar 
collateral ligament (UCL) in 
the elbow is reconstructed. In 
order to do so, the damaged 
ligament is replaced with a 
tendon from another part of the 
body. Dr. Frank Jobe was the 
first to perform this surgery on 
a baseball player, and did so 
in 1974 on Dodgers’ pitcher 
Tommy John, after whom 
the surgical procedure was 
informally named. 
The initial prognosis for 
John’s surgery was grim, 
but after a roughly one-year 
rehabi l i ta t ion period,  he 
returned to baseball. John 
won 288 games throughout 
his career, and 164 of these 
came after this career-extending 
surgery that enabled him to 
assume the seventh slot on 
the all-time wins list for left-
handed pitchers in the MLB. 
T h i s  r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
surgery has vastly increased 
the likelihood of return for 
individuals with UCL damage, 
which became increasingly 
common af te r  th i s  e ra . 
According to modern studies, 
the success rate of Tommy 
John surgery hovers around 
90%.  Needing 
the surgery is 
still highly 
problematic 
f o r  b o t h 
players and 
f ranch i ses 
because i t 
can translate 
to the end 
of a career 
at any level of baseball. For 
the majority of pitchers, 
however, the surgery results 
in approximately a 9 month to 
1 year recovery period, down 
from a 12 to 16 month process 
when the surgery first became 
available to players. 
This high rate of full 
recovery from surgery was 
unprecedented prior to 1974, 
and UCL damage shortened the 
careers of an indeterminable 
number of great pitchers, 
speculatively including the 
3-time Cy Young winner Sandy 
Koufax. Tommy John surgery 
could have benefited many past 
pitchers, but the increasing 
prevalence of UCL injuries 
in recent years has made its 
importance especially clear in 
the today’s 
MLB. 
T h e 
g r e a t e r 
frequency 
o f T o m m y 
John surgeries c a n  b e 
attributed to numerous 
f a c t o r s , 
many of 
w h i c h 
stem from the competitive 
nature of youth baseball. This 
element also more specifically 
addresses the younger ages 
at which pitchers require 
the surgery. A study by the 
American Orthopedic Society 
How Tommy John Surgery Affects Baseball
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for Sports Medicine demonstrated a 
five-fold increase in serious elbow and 
shoulder injuries since 2000. Modern 
youth baseball players are throwing too 
frequently in order to keep pace with the 
intense competition necessary to reach 
the professional level. 
One reason for this excessive throwing 
is that sport specialization is becoming 
far more common in reaction to the high 
level of competition at lower levels. Dr. 
Robert Malina, Professor of Kinesiology 
at the University of Texas at Austin, 
suggests that although the rise in sport 
specialization is difficult to quantify, an 
increasing number of coaches, parents, 
and athletes believe that in order to be 
competitive, one should focus on one 
sport from an early age. Instead of a 
young athlete with a strong arm playing 
baseball in the spring and football in 
the fall, a prospective pitcher is more 
likely to choose one sport, maintaining 
the same throwing motion and inducing 
unrelenting elbow stress. Young pitchers 
tend to play year-round, which leaves 
inadequate time for the ligament to recover. 
Annual periodization requires sufficient 
rest from full effort pitching in order to 
effectively reduce ligament strain and 
ultimately avoid UCL reconstructive 
surgeries.
Several other aspects of competitive 
youth baseball significantly contribute 
to the rise in the number of Tommy 
John surgeries that are performed on 
professional baseball players. 
According to the American Sports 
Medicine Institute, young players are 
more frequently joining multiple leagues 
simultaneously, which can obscure pitch 
counts and stress the athletes’ arms. The 
ASMI also posits that pitchers throw 
curveballs very early on, which can 
prove detrimental in the event of poor 
pitching mechanics that 
predictably characterize 
much of youth baseball.
Finally, the emphasis 
on throwing with a high 
velocity in order to 
attract attention from 
scouts and competitive 
leagues leads to the 
s t ra ining of  UCLs. 
Constantly clocking 
young pitchers results 
in their constant effort 
at maximum velocity, 
which is compounded 
by playing year-round. 
Dr. James Andrews, a 
renowned physician 
who has performed this 
surgery on many notable 
p i t c h e r s ,  s u p p o r t s 
these theories by indicating that in his 
experience, operating on younger people 
is becoming more common. 
In 2000, players in high school 
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or younger accounted for 18% of the 
surgeries that he performed, whereas 
in 2010 that figure rose to 31%. Thus, 
higher competition at lower levels causes 
athletes to need the surgery at earlier ages 
or it develops issues that cause damage 
requiring surgery later on in careers. 
Effective prevention of UCL damage, 
best achieved by decreasing the volume of 
pitching and spending less time throwing 
at maximum velocity, 
is seldom contested 
by professionals  in 
the sports medicine 
community. The ASMI 
and the MLB itself even 
maintain positions to 
this effect. However, 
because this phenomenon 
occurs  among very 
young athletes who 
are encouraged by their 
coaches and parents to 
emphasize winning, 
these ent i t ies  can’t 
induce change. Thus, 
if parents and coaches 
continue to ignore the 
importance of mechanics 
and pitch count limits, 
and fail to denounce the 
use of performance enhancing substances, 
the damage done in these formative years 
will likely continue. 
Tommy John surgery has reached 
proportions large enough to warrant the 
American Sports Medicine Institute to 
deem it an “epidemic.” The precipitous 
rise, especially in recent years, is captured 
well in the following graph constructed 
by Bill Petti based on MLB disabled 
list statistics.
In spite of this alarming trend, efforts 
at the professional level to combat the 
issue are seemingly ineffective. As teams 
tried to reduce pitch counts for starters 
in the mid 2000’s to mitigate the Tommy 
John epidemic, the frequency of surgeries 
continued to rise. In 2000, there were 
160 games in which an individual’s pitch 
count was greater than 125. Throughout 
the next 10 years that number declined 
to an average of 39.9 games and never 
exceeded 70 in a given season. 
Nevertheless, throughout this period, 
the number of surgeries rose markedly. 
Of the 360 pitchers that started the 2013 
season, 124 had undergone at least one 
Tommy John surgery. These pitchers, 
who would have likely been forced to 
conclude their careers early prior to 
this 1974 revolution in sports medicine, 
have by and large returned to the game 
“Of the 360 
pitchers that 
started the 2013 
season, 124 
had undergone 
at least one 
Tommy John 
surgery.”
Infographic courtesy of SweetSpot Network
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pitching at the professional 
level. While the solutions to the 
frequency with which damage 
to the UCL remain difficult 
to implement, Tommy John 
surgery serves as a reactive 
solution for a tremendous 
number of professionals each 
year.
The amount of money saved 
by teams due to the return 
of players after undergoing 
surgery is illustrated clearly 
by the economic impact of 
the Nationals’ young pitcher 
Stephen Strasburg. From the 
very start of his professional 
career,  he drew national 
attention to the franchise at 
a scale unprecedented in the 
team’s history, as demonstrated 
by his quick rise to top the list 
in all-time best selling jerseys 
for the Nationals. His first start 
aired on the MLB Network and 
drew enough viewers to become 
the most watched program 
in the network’s history. 
Strasburg’s first two starts 
were sellouts at 
Nationals Park, 
which can be 
c o n t r a s t e d 
to  the  53% 
d e c l i n e  i n 
attendance the 
day after his 
debut. Just this 
first start alone 
accounted for 
approximately 
$1.5 million 
in additional 
revenue  for 
the franchise. 
P e r h a p s 
m o r e 
impor tan t ly, 
N a t i o n a l s ’ 
ratings for his 
starts remained 
substantially 
h igher  than 
other games, 
demonstrating 
h i s  l o n g -
term impact. 
F i n a n c i a l 
e x p e r t s 
valuated his 
contribution at approximately 
$25 million per year based 
on higher television ratings, 
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attendance rates, merchandise, 
and his role in helping the team 
reach the playoffs. Strasburg 
underwent  Tommy John 
surgery and returned to pitch 
at a high level 
for the team, 
i n d i c a t i n g 
the economic 
impac t  tha t 
Tommy John 
surgery has on 
the business of 
baseball. 
T h e 
impl ica t ions 
of this surgery 
e x t e n d  f a r 
beyond teams 
simply saving 
m o n e y  b y 
o f f e r i n g  a 
likely return for 
many talented 
pitchers after 
tearing their 
UCL’s .  The 
contemporary 
i s s u e  o f 
the  s lo t t ing 
s y s t e m  f o r 
amateur draft 
bonuses that 
cons i s t en t ly 
emerges during 
c o l l e c t i v e 
ba rga in ing  would  be  a 
considerably greater issue 
without this surgery. 
The league seeks to prevent 
exorbitant bonuses for young 
players on the basis of fear 
of injury, and that concern is 
exacerbated by hard-throwing 
pitchers. Strasburg is a prime 
example of why a hard-slotting 
system should be implemented; 
however, in the absence of 
this surgery, bonuses would 
be even further suppressed. 
This suppression would be 
necessitated by the constant 
expense of replacing pitchers 
that had their careers shortened 
by tearing their UCL’s. Thus, 
the paradigm of scouting and 
investing in young talent would 
be significantly different 
without the efficacy of Tommy 
John surgery. 
Other names such as Chris 
Carpenter, John Smoltz, Adam 
Wainwright, Ben Sheets, A.J. 
Burnett, and most notably 
Tommy John would have been 
absent from their prominent 
places in baseball history prior 
to Dr. Jobe’s innovation in 
UCL surgery. Without these 
individuals as well as the 
approximate one-third of 
current pitchers who have 
been affected by the surgery, 
less effective pitchers would 
have filled their places, many 
of whom in turn would get 
injured after assuming more 
innings in starting roles. 
B y  e x p a n d i n g  t h i s 
opportunity, the quality of 
pitching and thus the game itself 
would be considerably altered 
and likely diminished. Teams 
are also afforded financial 
benefits as a result of the return 
of prominent starting pitchers, 
some of whom bring in tens of 
millions of dollars annually 
to their respective franchises. 
The nature of scouting and 
investing in young talent 
would also be significantly 
altered in the absence of this 
procedure. Thus, Tommy John 
surgery, the most famous 
surgery in sports, has proved 
revolutionary in protecting 
pitchers, substantially shaping 
the game both in business and 
on the field today.
THE NUMBER of Tommy John surgeries in baseball has risen exponentially since the 1970s.
Graph by Damian O’Sullivan
Season vs. Number of Tommy John Surgeries
“A study by 
the American 
Orthopedic 
Society 
for Sports 
Medicine 
demonstrated 
a five-fold 
increase in 
serious elbow 
and shoulder 
injuries since 
2000.” 
Special thank you to 
Bloomberg, Inc. for 
providing printing of 
this issue
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A Case Study of Apparel Sponsorship in Sports
SPONSORSHIP has become such an important aspect of the sports industry. Fans no longer 
just support teams and players; they support brands.
Photo courtesy of East Bay Blog
Evan Lefkovitz ‘16
Earlier this year, Nike and 
Under Armour engaged in a 
heated bidding war for the 
sponsorship rights to Kevin 
Durant, with Nike winning 
his services by offering him a 
contract for 10 years and $275 
million. Given this ostensibly 
exorbitant cost, one has to ask 
whether the exposure and 
revenues earned from these 
types of ventures are sufficient 
enough to justify them in the 
long run. 
We can attempt to provide 
an answer to this question by 
evaluating current and past 
sponsorship deals between 
apparel companies and colleges, 
leagues, and individual players. 
To narrow the scope of this 
study, we will focus on the most 
prominent apparel companies 
in the United States: Nike, 
Under Armour, and Adidas. By 
analyzing these partnerships 
with athletic entities through a 
cost-benefit paradigm, we can 
determine whether large-scale 
sponsorship deals are viable 
and justifiable for major firms. 
College Sports
The prevalence of mega-
deals between universities and 
apparel providers is only a 
recent trend. In fact, until the 
1980’s, college teams would 
simply purchase 
apparel from 
d i f f e r e n t 
vendors. That 
all changed in 
1988, when the 
University of 
Miami  asked 
Nike to 
b e  t h e 
o f f i c i a l 
sneaker provider to its entire 
athletic program. No company 
had ever been granted this type 
of monopolistic platform, in 
which it could not only be the 
sole distributor of shoes to the 
players, but to fans, students, 
and alumni as well. 
This deal laid the foundation 
for modern-day relationships 
between universi t ies and 
apparel providers. Instead 
of searching for uniform and 
sneaker vendors, a university 
is offered equipment, cash, 
and other perks from apparel 
companies, which in turn are 
given the sole sponsorship 
rights for the university. 
Nike, Adidas, and Under 
Armour do not report revenues 
earned from university 
contracts, so I 
will  evaluate 
t h e i r  m e r i t 
b a s e d  o n 
additional pieces 
o f  ev idence . 
The Port land 
Business Journal 
estimated 
that Nike, 
A d i d a s , 
and Under Armour combined 
to pay over $250 million to 
college athletic programs in 
2013. On its face, this would 
seem inherently illogical from 
the perspective of an athletic 
apparel company. What does 
a business gain by paying a 
university for the right to 
provide uniforms to its athletes? 
First, signing contracts with 
universities enables them to 
secure exclusive merchandising 
rights. The Collegiate Licensing 
Company (CLC) reported that 
“the retail marketplace for 
college-licensed merchandise 
in 2013 was estimated at $4.59 
billion.” These merchandising 
contracts permit large apparel 
companies be the sole provider 
of gear to all of a university’s 
sports teams. 
The amount of capital 
and manufacturing capacity 
necessary for securing these 
exclusive contracts allows 
major firms like Nike to 
dominate this lucrative market. 
Thus, the profits earned from 
merchandise  sales  could 
potentially outweigh the cost of 
paying for the rights to supply 
the apparel. 
S e c o n d ,  o b t a i n i n g 
sponsorship rights means 
pervasive exposure that can be 
used as a marketing tool to drive 
consumer demand. Typical 
contracts give companies the 
right to place their logos on 
the facilities, equipment, and 
apparel of both the players 
and staff. Stipulations are even 
drawn up that prevent players 
from covering logos with tape. 
Dur ing  broadcas ts  of 
college sports, the national 
platform serves as a showcase 
of their products to current 
and prospective customers. 
Portland Business Journal 
writer Matthew Kish made an 
astute observation by noting 
that the game itself is a cheaper 
al ternat ive to t radi t ional 
advertisements, which can 
cost as much as $1 million 
for 30 seconds of air time. 
Rather, companies invest a few 
million dollars in these schools, 
and in return will have their 
logos broadcast on national 
television for two or three hours 
during games and on nightly 
shows like SportsCenter. In 
return, companies hope to win 
the hearts of loyal fans that 
could potentially purchase not 
only college-related products, 
but additional items that the 
businesses sell as well.
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“Obtaining 
sponsorship 
rights means 
pervasive 
exposure that 
can be used as 
a marketing 
tool to drive 
consumer 
demand.”
Professional Leagues
In 2006, Adidas signed an 11-year 
deal worth more than $400 million to 
become the official supplier of NBA 
uniforms and apparel. The Business 
Journal estimates that Adidas brings 
in about $300 million in revenue from 
NBA merchandising rights. Employing 
the same twofold reasoning used above 
for college sponsorships, one can see the 
significant benefits enjoyed by Adidas. 
The company has exclusive selling rights 
on the official online NBA 
Store, giving it a significant 
leg up on its competitors in 
jersey and other apparel 
sales. The Adidas logo 
is visible on warm-
up gear, practice 
u n i f o r m s ,  a n d 
even on D-League 
jerseys. 
H o w e v e r , 
Adidas still faces some disadvantages 
in the marketplace. While Adidas is the 
only brand allowed to sell official NBA 
merchandise, Nike and Under Armour have 
the right to use NBA jerseys to market 
their own stars and sneaker products. 
Furthermore, Adidas’ exposure is limited 
by the fact that its logo is not placed 
on game-worn official NBA jerseys. 
Nevertheless, a provision in the most 
recent collective bargaining agreement 
has opened the door to sponsor logos 
being placed on NBA jerseys, potentially 
giving Adidas the opportunity to feature 
its logo on the jersey in the near future. 
In October 2010, Nike signed a 5-year 
deal valued at approximately $1.1 billion 
with the NFL. The deal is similar in 
structure to Adidas’ deal with the NBA, 
in that Nike supplies all jerseys, pants, 
gloves, and other accessories to NFL 
teams and has merchandising rights to sell 
goods through the NFL Shop. However, 
Nike shares the rights to sell apparel 
to fans with other firms such as G-III 
Apparel and VF Corporation (Majestic 
Athletic), which limit their control over 
the NFL marketplace. Yet, Nike’s deal 
could be deemed superior to Adidas in 
two ways. 
First off, Nike is allowed to display 
its logo on game day jersey, an added 
level of exposure on national broadcasts 
that Adidas does not have. Furthermore, 
players are not allowed to display the 
Adidas’ logo during games, forcing 
Adidas-sponsored stars like Robert 
Griffin III to put tape over their cleats 
each week. Second, as Portland Business 
Journal writer Erik Siemers points out, 
Nike, the undoubted leader in the sports 
apparel business, has a partnership with 
the NFL that is strategically sound. To a 
company that pulls in roughly $25 billion 
in sales, the estimated $500 million it 
will earn in yearly revenue from the deal 
doesn’t seem all that significant. But by 
securing the NFL rights, Nike prevents 
up-and-coming competitors like Under 
Armour from gaining the business that 
could significantly enhance its brand 
and turn it into a viable international 
competitor. Thus, Nike has 
utilized its deal with the NFL 
as an instrument to maintain its 
profound control over 
the sports apparel 
market. 
Individual Athletes
Signing an individual athlete to a 
sponsorship deal is inherently the most 
risky investment for sports apparel 
companies. While teams and leagues 
will have a steady stream of loyal and 
new fans for years to come, athletes only 
play for a short window of time. Often, 
these athletes are signed right out of 
college, before they ever suit up for a 
professional game. During their careers, 
athletes are not guaranteed sustained 
success, a clean bill of 
health, or a sustained 
positive public image. 
As a result, the return 
on investment for some 
of these contracts could 
potentially be mitigated 
by external factors. 
Companies  thus 
must make calculated 
moves in their effort 
to find the “right star.” 
These deals often turn 
into substantial sales 
generators, but, in some 
instances, companies 
may not earn enough 
revenue to cover the 
costs of contracts, or 
can even face public 
relations nightmares 
that can damage their 
reputations. 
  I n d i v i d u a l 
sponsorship is different 
than leagues and teams. When signing a 
deal with a superstar, companies devote 
resources and entire product lines to a 
single individual, whose popularity and 
talent are looked upon to boost brand 
identity and ultimately sales revenue. 
Nowhere is this more visible and prevalent 
than in the NBA, where companies vie 
for the rights to supply sneakers to the 
game’s most marketable stars. This trend 
was set by Nike and Michael Jordan in 
the 1980’s, who turned a $500,000 a year 
sneaker deal into an entire subdivision 
of Nike that generated $2.5 billion in 
sales revenue and held 54% of the U.S. 
basketball sneaker market in 2013. 
Jordan’s rise to prominence fostered 
the development of a sneaker-crazed 
market, one in which every NBA star 
needs a requisite sneaker deal and 
subsequent marketing campaigns. This 
strategy has paid significant dividends 
for Nike, which brought in $525 million 
in combined sales revenue in 2013 from 
its 3 biggest stars: LeBron James, Kevin 
Durant, and Kobe Bryant. Adidas earned 
$50 million from Derrick Rose, John 
Wall, and Dwight Howard, and recently 
signed a megadeal with young Portland 
Trail Blazers superstar Damian Lillard 
that calls for the release of a personalized 
shoe line in the spring of 2015. 
For all the glitz and glamor of a brand 
new LeBron sneaker or a Kobe commercial, 
there are business forces at play that put 
the value of these individual contracts 
into question. The sneaker industry is in 
the midst of a significant boon, with sales 
reaching $4.5 billion in 
2013. But as of 2014, 
Nike and its Jordan 
brand occupy 92 percent 
of the U.S. basketball 
sneaker market. 
In contrast, Adidas 
only owns 5.5% of the 
market ,  and Under 
A r m o u r  a  m e a s l y 
0.7%. In the long run, 
is it really worth it 
for Adidas and Under 
Armour to dole out 
millions of dollars to 
the likes of Rose and 
Lillard if Nike will 
continue to dominate 
and control the market? 
Nike has perfected the 
art of choosing the right 
“stars .”  They have 
the NBA’s two most 
marketable  p layers 
under contract in James 
and Durant, with the latter recently signed 
to a huge deal in an effort to keep him 
away from Under Armour. 
Forbes notes that the gap between 
these two players and everyone else is 
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significant, as Durant’s shoe 
sales are three times greater 
than the third highest earner, 
Kobe Bryant. On the flip side, 
Nike lets less marketable stars 
like Stephen Curry and Dwayne 
Wade, who’s arguably well past 
his prime, sign with smaller 
competitors. Moreover, the 
revenue earned from many 
of these deals doesn’t even 
cover the costs. According to 
estimates by Forbes sneaker 
expert Matt Powell, even Kevin 
Durant and pre-2012 LeBron 
did not generate enough shoe 
revenue to match the 12-13% of 
sales Nike spends on marketing 
each product. 
Therefore, if the league’s 
biggest superstars have trouble 
propelling Nike into the green, 
does it really make sense for 
these companies to pursue 
deals worth $20-$30 million 
per year? Apparently companies 
have caught on to this trend, 
as the incoming rookie class 
did not receive large contracts 
akin to the $70 million deal 
that Kevin Durant got from 
Nike in 2007, or even the $25 
million John Wall received 
from Reebok in 2010. Rather, 
Andrew Wiggins and Adidas 
signed the largest contract 
for a reported guarantee of 
$2 million per year, indicating 
that companies now understand 
that the benefits may not 
outweigh the costs for these 
types of deals.
Aside from the monetary 
risks, athletes are subject 
to other factors that make 
these  sponsorsh ip  dea ls 
inherently precarious. The 
chance of athletes getting 
injured is always a concern 
outside of the company’s 
control. As Paul George’s 
injury showed in the 
summer of 2014, 
freak accidents 
can plague 
even the 
m o s t 
d u r a b l e 
of stars. 
In the case of Adidas, the 
company faces an unfair stigma 
that its shoes are the “cause” 
of injuries. 
Its two most marketable 
s tars ,  Robert  Griff in III 
and Derr ick Rose,  have 
each suffered serious knee 
injuries while wearing Adidas 
products, perpetuating a bad 
reputation among both fans 
and consumers. Even worse, 
athletes may commit morally 
and legally reprehensible 
crimes while under contract 
that can damage the image of 
the company. In the case of 
Michael Vick, Ray Rice, and 
Oscar Pistorius, Nike had no 
choice but to sever ties with 
these clients after they were 
convicted of crimes. 
Two of  Nike’s  mos t 
reputable and important stars, 
Lance Armstrong and Adrian 
Peterson, were let go after their 
own scandals. These cases shed 
light upon the tenuous nature of 
athlete-company relationships, 
illustrating the fact that even the 
brightest stars do not represent 
a risk-free investment.
Conclusion
Although we can’t make 
definitive determinations about 
athletic sponsorships as a whole, 
we can draw some meaningful 
conclusions. It would seem 
that the safest investment for 
athletic apparel companies is 
college apparel. The companies 
get exclusive rights to outfit a 
given university, meaning that 
it does not have to compete 
with the other big companies 
once it signs the contract. 
These contracts virtually 
give big companies a monopoly 
at large institutions with loyal 
fan bases and thousands of 
s tuden t s  and  a lumni , 
representing a significant 
growth opportuni ty. 
League sponsorships 
for Nike and Adidas 
a re  a l so  sound 
b u s i n e s s 
moves. They 
give these 
companies 
the ability to 
crowd out their competitors in 
the sale of official NFL and 
NBA merchandise respectively, 
as well a national television 
forum for presenting their 
brands to the public. 
The biggest wild card 
for big apparel companies is 
the athlete sponsorship deal. 
While fans like to emulate their 
favorite players by purchasing 
their customized sneakers and 
other gear, the suboptimal 
revenue streams, injury threat, 
and public relations disasters 
are ever-present possibilities 
that can cause contracts to 
become burdens rather than 
boosters. The recent decline 
in the value of rookie sneaker 
deals in the NBA is a reflection 
of the understanding that 
sponsoring individual athletes 
may not be worth the risk. 
So what does this all mean? 
With the big 4 sports leagues 
locked into contracts with 
apparel providers through 
at least 2017, the evidence 
suggests that Nike, Adidas, and 
Under Armour should pursue 
universities with strong athletic 
departments, large and loyal 
fan bases, and championship 
pedigrees. Understanding the 
lucrative potential of university 
partnerships, Under Armour 
signed a deal with iconic Notre 
Dame for an undisclosed sum 
that is reported to be the most 
valuable contract in college 
sports history.
It would seem likely that 
the value of these contracts 
wil l  cont inue to r ise  as 
prominent universities seek 
new sponsorship deals in the 
future. On the other side of the 
spectrum, it will be interesting 
to see if the contracts with 
individual athletes will continue 
to decline in value. The best 
indicator for the future of 
individual contracts will come 
when a transcendent athlete 
in the mold of the LeBron 
rises through the ranks and 
dominates at the college level. 
If this hypothetical superstar 
fails to receive significant 
amounts of money, it could be a 
sign of a permanent downward 
trend in the value of contracts 
between individual athletes 
and apparel firms. 
APPAREL COMPANIES acquire the right to feature their gear 
prominently at official university stores, like Nike does at The 
Duck Store in Clackamas, Oregon.
Photo courtesy of R & H Construction
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A New Dead Ball Era?
The Effects of Declining Offense in Baseball
Andrew Distler ‘15
In  i t s  f amous  1998 
commercial, Nike claimed, 
“Chicks dig the long ball.” 
This slogan was appropriate 
at the time, as Mark McGwire 
and Sammy Sosa were chasing 
Roger Maris’s 37-year-old 
single season home run record. 
The two mashers headed a surge 
in offense in Major League 
Baseball that thrust the sport 
to the center of attention after 
the 1994 strike threatened the 
league’s popularity. But that era 
of incredible offensive numbers 
is long gone, as baseball is 
witnessing some of the lowest 
offensive production in years. 
In  2014,  MLB teams 
averaged just 4.07 runs per 
game, the lowest total for a 
non-strike-shortened season 
since 1976 (and down more 
than a full run since 2000). 
Meanwhile, players are hitting 
just .251, the lowest average 
since 1972, the year before the 
American League instituted 
the designated hitter. Home 
run rates, slugging percentage, 
and on-base percentage are 
all at their 
l o w e s t 
to ta ls  in 
o v e r  2 0 
y e a r s . 
H i t t e r s 
a r e  n o w 
s t r i k i n g 
out more 
than ever, 
whiffing 7.70 times per game 
during the 2014 season, the 
highest in MLB history. And 
2014 is not an outlier, as the 
strikeout rate record has been 
broken in seven consecutive 
seasons, including the 2014 
campaign.
This decline in offense has 
been attributed to a variety of 
factors, ranging from changes 
in how pitchers are developed 
rule changes that benefit 
defensive play. Teams in the 
NBA and NFL are now scoring 
at extremely high rates thanks 
in large part to rule changes 
that limit defenses; the NHL 
did not change any rules when 
scoring exploded in the 1980s; 
and Major League Baseball 
almost never institutes rules 
that greatly benefit pitchers. 
However, every time there 
have been rule changes to 
help hitters, pitchers have 
been able to adjust. 
One of the first significant 
changes was in 1893, when 
the pi tching mound was 
moved back from 50 feet 
to its current distance of 60 
feet and 6 inches. Offensive 
production immediately went 
up, as, just two years after the 
change, teams were averaging 
over two runs more per game 
than they were beforehand. 
However, offense soon went 
back down again; by 1908, the 
“Dead Ball Era” had begun, 
and teams averaged just over 
three runs per game, more than 
four runs fewer than what they 
scored in the early 1890s. A 
new baseball featuring a cork 
center, made standard in 1910, 
caused teams to score almost 
one whole run more per game, 
but once again the pitchers 
adjusted and run production 
returned to below four runs 
per game. 
The next  change was 
arguably one of the most 
significant rule changes in 
baseball history: in 1920, 
doctoring the baseball (such 
as throwing spitballs) was 
banned, which yielded a huge 
surge in offense. With Babe 
Ruth popularizing the home 
run, run production increased 
dramatically, culminating in 
1930 when teams averaged 5.55 
runs per game, still the highest 
total since 1900, and hit for 
an astonishing .296 average. 
H o w e v e r ,  o f f e n s i v e 
production started declining 
right after that, as pitchers 
once again adjusted to the new 
landscape, which eventually 
led to the “Year of the Pitcher” 
TEAMS MIGHT start to prioritize developing or signing the best bats available over signing 
the big-name pitchers to mega-deals.
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and trained to advances in 
analytics that help pitchers 
much more than they do hitters. 
Declining offensive production 
has also been brought up as 
a potential reason for why 
baseba l l ’s  popular i ty  i s 
declining, particularly among 
Millennials and succeeding 
generations.
However, 
one thing is 
for certain: 
this decline 
in  scor ing 
d o e s  n o t 
appear to be 
stopping any 
t ime soon, 
and it will take many changes 
and adjustments for hitters 
to gain ground on pitchers. 
This article will discuss how 
offensive levels became so 
low, and how this trend can 
potentially affect the future 
of baseball. 
Will Hitters Ever Evolve?
In sports, there are rarely 
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in 1968. That year, teams averaged 
an anemic 3.42 runs per game, which 
was the lowest since 1908, and offensive 
production was so low that Bob Gibson 
managed to lose nine games despite 
boasting a 1.12 ERA. 
The next season, the mound was 
lowered five inches, the strike zone 
was made smaller, and offense slowly 
improved until the late 1980s, which was 
the start of the “steroid era.” Spurred 
on by a combination of performance-
enhancing drugs, smaller ballparks, better 
bat technology, and juiced baseballs 
(according to some theories), offense 
and particularly home run production 
grew at incredible rates. 
Several home run records were either 
broken or set in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
as it seemed that power hitting had taken 
over baseball. But once again, pitchers 
were able to adjust, and run production 
is now almost as low as it was during the 
“Dead Ball Era” (this recent decline is 
almost always credited to stronger drug 
testing, but many view this as a weak 
argument, as several pitchers were also 
taking performance-enhancing drugs).
Before we can delve into any one reason 
for the most recent decline in offense, 
it is very important to realize that there 
have been countless adjustments made 
by baseball to help increase offense. But 
even if they were initially successful, 
pitchers have always seemed to adjust 
through improved training, development, 
and strategy. In order to reverse the current 
trend of declining offense, hitters must 
make adjustments themselves, rather than 
wait for rule changes to help them. 
In order to do this, MLB teams are 
going to have to not only start developing 
their prospects differently, but also start 
scouting and drafting players differently. 
One of the reasons that pitchers have 
recently been able to gain the upper hand 
is that they are throwing the ball with 
more velocity than ever before, with 
more pitchers throwing in the upper 90s 
and sometimes 
even topping 
out at 100 mph 
( e s p e c i a l l y 
r e l i e v e r s ) . 
Because more 
a n d  m o r e 
p i t c h e r s  a r e 
able to throw 
with so much 
velocity, hitters 
are going to have 
to start training 
s p e c i f i c a l l y 
for those high 
speeds. 
It is likely 
t h a t  t e a m s 
w i l l  s t a r t 
e m p h a s i z i n g 
bat control and 
hitting the ball 
to all fields, and will start discouraging 
“dead pull” hitters, as it is much harder 
to pull a pitch at high velocities (this 
is a tactic that can also be used to beat 
shifts). There may even have to be a 
complete overhaul of the way hitters are 
developed and trained. This could mean 
focusing on different fundamentals from 
a young age or looking at new analytics. 
Developing Pitchers
The remarkable ability of pitchers to 
improve over time, especially in terms 
of velocity, is due in part to dramatic 
changes in the way they are developed and 
trained. In an era 
of specialization, 
where kids are 
often encouraged 
to train in just 
one sport (and 
often only one 
position in that 
sport), players 
are now starting 
s p e c i a l i z e d 
pitching training 
at much younger 
ages. Kids are 
now pi tching 
more often than 
e v e r  b e f o r e , 
as many elite 
younger pitchers 
will sometimes 
p i t c h  f o r 
multiple teams 
at once and work with a private coach. 
Even though this kind of training is often 
blamed for the rise in arm injuries among 
MLB pitchers, it is a reason why pitchers 
have been able to gain such a significant 
advantage over hitters. 
Another reason pitchers have been 
able improve their performance is that 
they are now doing more weight and 
aerobics training than ever before. Bo 
Jackson is often credited with popularizing 
weight training in baseball, but that trend 
took longer to affect pitchers. Now that 
it has, it has helped them not only to 
throw harder, but to throw off-speed and 
breaking pitches with more movement 
and consistency. The increased ability 
to better throw off-speed pitches is seen 
in the numbers. 
According to FanGraphs,  even 
though strikeout rates are the highest 
they have ever been (while walk rates 
have been relatively constant in recent 
years), fastballs as a percentage of total 
pitches thrown have dropped roughly 7% 
in the past decade. This decrease has been 
coupled with an increase in the use of 
the cutter and other secondary pitches. 
The data show that pitchers are now 
able to throw off-speed and secondary 
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RUNS PER GAME in 2014 were at a historic low, a trend that has developed since 
the steroid-era in MLB.
Chart by Andrew Distler
“One thing is for 
certain: this decline 
in scoring does not 
appear to be stopping 
any time soon, and it 
will take many changes 
and adjustments for 
hitters to gain ground 
on pitchers.”
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pitches more frequently without 
compromising accuracy, which 
will of course make hitting 
even more difficult. 
Unless there are more rule 
or equipment changes on the 
horizon, hitters must find new 
ways to train and develop as 
well. The offensive decline 
is happening so quickly that 
it may even take an entire 
overhaul of the youth baseball 
system to ensure that hitters 
are ready once they reach the 
big leagues. This could mean 
starting to emphasize more 
specialization among young 
hitters (similar to what has 
been done with pitchers) and 
even introducing new training 
regimens to improve bat speed 
and hand-eye coordination. 
While improvements in 
pitching can be attributed 
largely to better training and 
development, another factor 
is the development of more 
pitchers. In response to the 
high- scoring 1990s, teams 
started to realize that pitching, 
particularly in the postseason, 
was the most important aspect 
of the game. Because offensive 
numbers were so high, good 
hitters were viewed as “a dime 
a dozen” type players that could 
be found anywhere, therefore 
making pitchers much more 
desirable. 
An example is the Colorado 
Rockies, who signed pitcher 
Mike Hampton in 2001 to what 
at the time was the largest 
contract in sports history, 
after he was 15-10 with a 
3.12 ERA the previous year 
for the Mets. Teams were so 
desperate for pitching that 
they were willing to give out 
large contracts to pitchers with 
somewhat pedestrian numbers. 
Stockpiling pitchers became 
such a priority that it can even 
be argued that teams have over-
drafted pitchers and have not 
focused enough on developing 
hitters. 
It is very possible that this 
trend will be reversed, and 
we could see more emphasis 
on hitters being drafted and 
developed. We are already 
seeing this kind of strategy 
Andrew Distler is a senior in the 
College of Arts and Sciences. He 
can be reached at abd76@cornell.
edu.
put into action in MLB farm 
systems. An example is the 
Chicago Cubs, who have 
focused much of their recent 
rebuilding on stockpiling and 
developing hitting prospects, 
as the market is seemingly 
oversaturated with pitchers 
who can either consistently 
give quality starts or can be 
shut-down relievers. 
The Impact of Analytics 
Another recent advancement 
that has curbed offense is the 
continued growth of analytics 
in baseball. This may seem like 
an odd reason, as analytics have 
affected every aspect of the 
game, but the most prominent 
analytical techniques favor 
pitching and defense. An 
example is defensive shifts. 
Once only done by a few, this 
is now a tactic used often by 
almost every team. 
N o w  t h a t  a d v a n c e d 
s t a t i s t i ca l  t r ack ing  can 
accurately keep track of every 
batter’s hitting tendencies, it is 
easier than ever for a defense 
to align itself to take away 
a hitter’s strengths. In fact, 
shifts have been credited so 
much with the recent decline 
in offense that there have been 
discussions among baseball 
fans and writers about banning 
them. However, shifts are only 
one of the many strategies that 
have recently contributed to 
decreased run production. 
Because analytics have 
allowed us to measure fielding 
in new ways, teams are able 
to more easily identify good 
fielders, making it harder for 
the offense to get hits. Also, 
statistics such as defensive 
runs saved have shown how 
many runs are allowed due 
to poor defense, which has 
compelled teams to increase 
their emphasis on fielding. 
Statistics such as defensive 
WAR and Ultimate Zone Rating 
(UZR) have helped strengthen 
fielding all across Major League 
Baseball, making it tougher 
on hitters.
Pitching analytics have 
also become more prominent. 
Even though pitcher domination 
is related more to better and 
harder-throwing pitchers, 
recent developments have 
given pitchers extremely in-
depth information about hitters. 
An example is PITCHF/x, a 
pitch tracking system installed 
in every MLB stadium. This 
system is able to track the 
veloci ty,  movement ,  and 
location of every pitch and 
even provides pitchers with 
information about  hitters’ 
weaknesses. This is yet another 
recent innovation that has given 
pitchers more of an advantage. 
Implications for the 
Future
It is no secret to anyone 
who follows baseball closely 
that offense is declining to 
rates last seen in the “Dead 
Ball Era” of the early 1900s. 
Many articles have been written 
about it, and many theories 
have been hatched. But the 
major question that needs 
to be asked is: how will the 
offensive decline affect the 
future of baseball? 
Since pitchers are not 
getting any weaker or throwing 
any slower, hitters must be 
able to adjust to the increase 
in pitch velocity and pitcher 
skill. This is much easier said 
than done, as hitters only have 
a fraction of a second to react 
to any pitch. Another key issue 
is how baseball’s decline in 
scoring will affect fan interest. 
The NFL and NBA are now 
very high scoring, and the TV 
ratings and interest in both of 
those leagues have never been 
higher. With baseball’s low 
scoring rates, one must wonder 
if our “national pastime” 
(which is already a slower, 
more drawn-out game) will 
become even less appealing 
to the next generation of fans. 
An argument can be made 
that this is just cyclical, and 
in a few years we will start 
see ing  h igher  o ffens ive 
numbers, whether it be due 
to improved technology, new 
rules, or different development 
strategies. It is entirely possible 
that flame-throwing relievers 
and starters who can give a team 
quality starts will eventually 
become “dime a dozen” type 
players, and teams will start 
investing more money and more 
draft picks on hitters. But it 
is undeniable that the decline 
in run scoring in baseball is 
significant enough that major 
changes are needed to reverse 
the trend. 
THE DAYS of Roger Maris (pictured above) and 60 homerun 
seasons may very well be a thing of the past.
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Business Sponsors 
and the Public 
Press for Change
Taylor Kosakoff ‘16
THE ACTIONS of athletes like Adrian Peterson (pictured 
above) have long-lasting consequences on the NFL, the team, 
and their sponsors.
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In our society, professional 
athletes serve as important 
role models. They exhibit 
qualities such as teamwork, 
sportsmanship, and heroism 
that influence young children. 
A t h l e t e s  a l s o  p r o v i d e 
entertainment for a large 
portion of the country and 
even internationally. They even 
have the power to revive a city 
economically. Time Magazine 
reported that LeBron James 
is worth almost $500 million 
to the city of Cleveland in 
his return to the Cavaliers. 
However, the entertainment 
and economic value of athletes 
should never put them above 
the law. Recent criminal and 
morally reprehensible behavior 
by star athletes has significantly 
affected how society perceives 
athletes and professional 
s p o r t s leagues. 
P u b l i c 
outcry has 
c a u s e d 
s p o n s o r s 
to be more 
s o c i a l l y 
conscious 
and apply 
p r e s s u r e 
to athletes, 
teams, and 
leagues in 
o r d e r  t o 
enact change 
a n d  i m p o s e 
severe consequences 
on prominent players who 
commit  he inous  cr imes . 
Businesses are increasingly 
impacting professional sports 
by imposing their financial 
leverage to stimulate social 
change. 
S t a r  a t h l e t e s  a r e 
commodities for business 
sponsors, who compete to 
have the best players represent 
their products in marketing 
campaigns. A player like Derek 
Jeter, who did everything the 
right way on and off the field, 
is an example of an athlete that 
business sponsors eagerly want 
to support and associate with 
their products. Jeter embarked 
on his farewell tour in 2014 and 
was hailed as the paragon of a 
role model. Jeter signed a 10 
year, $100 million contract with 
Nike, and, according to the New 
York Post, also has lucrative 
deals with Gatorade, Gillette, 
Ford, and other businesses. 
Jeter’s character as a captain, 
philanthropist, and citizen of 
New York was valued as much 
as his exceptional talent on 
the baseball field.
Unfortunately, while many 
athletes exhibit extraordinary 
talent on the field to excite 
s p e c t a t o r s ,  t h e r e  a r e 
increasingly 
more players 
who exhibit 
the type of 
b e h a v i o r 
t h a t 
d e s t r o y s 
the t rust 
a n d 
r e s p e c t 
o f  t h e i r 
followers. 
Recently, 
t h e 
reputations 
o f  p layers , 
teams,  and even 
leagues have been tainted 
by the  cr iminal  ac t ions 
of several  ‘star ’ athletes 
who committed criminal or 
morally reprehensible acts. 
In the past, domestic violence 
issues involving athletes were 
swept under the rug. Recently, 
however, the power of public 
opinion has intensified, and 
sponsors have reacted by 
putting pressure on professional 
sports teams and leagues to 
reevaluate their domestic 
violence policies. 
Adrian Peterson and Ray 
Rice are ‘star’ players whose 
talents are exceptional at the 
running back position. Adrian 
Peterson has a career total of 
10,190 rushing yards and 86 
rushing touchdowns, while Ray 
Rice has 6,180 rushing yards 
and 37 rushing touchdowns 
during a six-year NFL career. 
Adrian Peterson was arrested 
for hitting his four-year-old 
son with a wooden switch, 
and Ray Rice was videotaped 
viciously punching his fiancée. 
Peterson and Rice’s careers 
were effectively halted by 
their actions, which left their 
respective teams to cope 
without their contributions 
on the field. 
Inappropriate behavior 
by professional athletes not 
only affects their teams, but 
also inf luences sponsors 
that back the athletes and 
their  organizations.  Such 
transgressions  negatively 
impact not only these athletes’ 
reputations, but also the brands 
and companies that rely on 
these athletes to market their 
products. Major companies like 
Nike and Castrol canceled their 
sponsorship of Peterson right 
after his arrest. Nike released a 
statement in response to Adrian 
Peterson’s actions saying, 
“Nike in no way condones 
chi ld abuse or  domest ic 
violence of any kind.” After 
Adrian Peterson’s actions 
were revealed, the Minnesota 
Vikings deactivated him, but 
then reactivated him after just 
one game. Minnesota Vikings 
sponsors and even Minnesota 
Governor Mark Dayton came 
out saying they disagreed 
with the team’s handling of 
the situation and pressured 
the team into suspending the 
running back for his actions. 
The Minnesota Vikings sponsor, 
Radisson Hotels, even withdrew 
its sponsorship of the team 
because it  felt Peterson’s 
situation was not handled the 
right way. Radisson came out 
with the statement, 
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“Radisson takes this matter very 
seriously particularly in the light of 
our long-standing commitment to the 
protection of children.” In response, the 
Vikings immediately suspended Peterson 
after pressure from sponsors and the 
public, acknowledging that they were 
wrong in how they handled the situation. 
 Sponsors were also displeased 
with how the National Football League 
handled Ray Rice’s situation. Originally, 
the league suspended Rice for two games. 
Many critics believed that if the NFL 
imposed a yearlong suspension on 
Cleveland Browns’ wide receiver Josh 
Gordon for smoking marijuana, then the 
punishment given to Ray Rice should 
have been far more severe. The release 
of the video depicting him striking 
his fiancée in an elevator resulted in 
increased sponsor and public pressure 
on the Baltimore Ravens and the NFL to 
increase the duration of Rice’s suspension 
The problem here is that many athletes 
have received less severe punishments 
for criminal actions for many years in 
both college and professional sports. Walt 
Bogdanich of the New York Times shared 
his research and opinions on how Florida 
State University and Tallahassee Police 
reacted to the claims that star quarterback 
Jameis Winston raped another college 
student. Winston, who is arguably the 
best player in all of college football, was 
accused of sexual assault on December 7th, 
ROGER GOODELL has been entrenched in controversy concerning his evaluation 
and handling of off-field conduct of NFL players.
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2013. Bogdanich explained that Winston’s 
case was delayed while his team was 
pushing for a college football national 
championship and that the university 
even disregarded 
possible evidence 
c o n n e c t i n g 
Winston to the 
sexual assault.
Even outside 
o f  f o o t b a l l , 
there are many 
e x a m p l e s  o f 
s t a r  a t h l e t e s 
who avoided the 
consequences of 
criminal actions. 
In 2003, future 
Hall  of Famer 
K o b e  B r y a n t 
o f  t h e  L o s 
Angeles Lakers 
was accused of 
sexual assault. 
A c c o r d i n g  t o 
Patrick O’Driscoll 
of USA Today, 
Bryant admitted 
to having sex with the accuser even 
though he was married and had a child 
and said the woman consented. Bryant 
was able to settle the case, which many 
critics believed was only because the 
woman could not refuse the amount of 
money Bryant was giving her. According 
to O’Driscoll, Bryant lost 4 to 6 million 
dollars in endorsement contracts after 
his arrest. 
 Statistics show disparities in arrest 
r a t e s  be tween 
National Football 
League players 
and the rest of 
society. According 
t o  R e u b e n 
F i s c h e r - B a u m 
from Deadspin, 
p r o f e s s i o n a l 
football players 
had higher arrest 
rates for assault/
battery/domestic 
c h a rg e s ,  D U I 
c h a r g e s ,  a n d 
weapons charges 
than  the  U.S . 
average. However, 
F i s c h e r - B a u m 
noted that these 
same players were 
“11 percent less 
likely to get a 
DUI, 23 percent 
less likely to get an assault charge, 
and 59 percent less likely to get a drug 
charge.” If known, sponsors and the public 
would frown upon these statistics, as 
athletes in the past have been treated like 
untouchable superheroes who can avoid 
consequences because of their elevated 
status in society.
After the National Football League’s 
response to Adrian Peterson and Ray 
Rice, many sponsors spoke out and shared 
their opinions about how these players 
were handled and what such companies 
stand for. For example, according to Ben 
Popken, Anheuser-Busch InBev NV was 
notably critical of the NFL’s response. 
Other sponsors of the National Football 
League, such as Budweiser, PepsiCo, 
Nike, Castrol, Campbell Soup Co., and 
McDonald’s, came out saying they look 
to improve the NFL’s domestic violence 
policy.
Although both the Peterson and Rice 
cases were not originally handled with 
sensitivity, the National Football League 
and other leagues have been swayed by 
public outcry and are now working in 
the right direction to educate, punish, 
and reduce domestic violence and other 
crimes in sports. According to Adam 
Howard of MSNBC, after running back 
Jonathan Dwyer of the Arizona Cardinals 
was arrested for domestic assault, the 
CEO of PepsiCo, Indra Nooyi, said, 
“I  am a mother,  a wife and a 
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“Recent criminal and 
morally reprehensible 
behavior by 
star athletes has 
significantly affected 
how society perceives 
athletes and 
professional sports 
leagues.” 
passionate football fan. I 
am deeply disturbed that the 
new repugnant behavior of 
a few players and the NFL’s 
acknowledged mishandling 
of these issues is casting a 
cloud over the integrity of the 
league and the reputations of 
the majority of the players 
who’ve dedicated their lives 
to a career they love…I know 
[NFL commissioner Roger 
Goodell] to be a man of 
integrity, and I am confident 
that he will do the right thing 
for the league in the light of 
the serious issues it is facing.”
The essence of Nooyi’s 
message is important because 
women are crucial to the 
success of the National Football 
League. According to Drew 
Harwell of the Washington 
Post, females comprise nearly 
45 percent of the NFL fan base. 
If players continue to get away 
with serious crimes like child 
abuse and domestic violence, 
professional sports leagues 
may experience a significant 
decline in female fans very 
quickly. However, Nooyi is 
right.  Professional sports 
leagues, teams, and even law 
enforcement have mishandled 
important issues in the past, but 
times have changed. Athletes 
can no longer receive special 
privileges not afforded to others 
when it comes to breaking the 
law. 
C u r r e n t  a c t i o n s  b y 
professional sports leagues 
have led to optimism and a 
better policy system when it 
comes to athletes and the law. 
According to Tom Pelissero 
of USA TODAY Sports, the 
NFL appointed four women to 
handle the task of shaping the 
league’s policies going forward: 
Anna Isaacson, who is now VP 
of Social Responsibility; Lisa 
Friel, who was the former leader 
of the Sex Crimes Prosecution 
Unit in the NY County District 
Attorney’s Office; NO MORE 
co-founder Jane Randel; and 
Rita Smith, the former director 
of the National Coalition 
Against Domestic Violence. 
According to USA TODAY, 
Majo r  League  Baseba l l 
Commissioner Bud Selig 
hired former federal prosecutor 
Bryan Seeley to take charge 
of the league’s investigations 
depar tment .  Seeley  now 
deals with the problems of 
performance-enhancing drugs, 
policy violations, and law 
enforcement. According to 
SB Nation’s Mark Prada, 
the  Nat iona l  Baske tba l l 
Association’s Commissioner 
Adam Silver vowed to take 
a fresh look at the NBA’s 
domestic violence policies. 
 With considerable 
pressure from sponsors in all 
professional sports leagues 
and heightened sensitivity 
due to high profile cases of 
lawlessness, badly needed 
changes in domestic violence 
and other policies are coming 
to fruition. Although there are 
now higher standards for player 
conduct, there is still much to 
improve. Even in recent years, 
athletes were able to get away 
with similar crimes without 
team or league suspensions. 
Continuing pressure from 
both the public and business 
sponsors for new league and 
team policies will hold athletes 
accountable for their actions. 
Given the revered status of 
high-profi le sports stars, 
changes in professional sports 
could also impact behavior in 
our society.
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Taylor Kosakoff is a junior in the 
ILR School. He can be reached at 
tmk85@cornell.edu.
RAY RICE (pictured above with his wife, Janay Palmer) tried to save face during a press conference, but only seemed to make 
things worse for his relationship with the Ravens and its sponsors.
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